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1.
INTRODUCTION
The process of industrial innovation does not occur in a vacuum.
It is very strongly influenced by such environmental factors as the general
state of technological knowledge, market conditions and resource availability.
To an increasing extent these environmental factors are influenced directly
or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally by government policies and
activities.
Since there are a number of countries that have had a relatively
long experience with governmental policy to stimulate innovation, it is
appropriate to attempt to measure the actual impact of such policy. In
this way, different forms of policy, activity and institutional form can
be compared in terms of effectiveness, and individual countries can learn
both from self-examination and from comparison with others.
In addition to direct policy aimed at stimulating innovation, there
are many government policies that are intended for other purposes, but
can often have a serious effect on the process of innovation. Fiscal
and trade policies, for example, certainly influence the innovation process,
although this is seldom their principal intent. Consequently, any exam-
ination of governmental influence on innovation must consider the unintended
as well as the intentional impact.
RESEARCH METHOD
To assess the impact of government on the innovation process a sample
of projects, aimed at new product or process development, was chosen from
firms in five industries in France, West Germany, Holland, The United
Kingdom and Japan.l Firms were asked to nominate three R&D projects, around
which interviews would be focussed. The first of these was to be one re-
1For a more complete report on the entire study see Center for Policy
Alternatives (1976).-
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garded as a commercial success; the second was to be a project which was
commercially unsuccessful; and the third was to be a project, still underway.
The successful and unsuccessful projects were to have been initiated after
1968. In order to better test the effects of more recent government policies,
data were also gathered on an ongoing project, from the post 1971 era.
The idea of sampling successful and unsuccessful projects was very
simply to see whether in a large sample government influence of different
sorts would be more often associated with one or the other. The ongoing
project was added to see whether changes in government policies over the
last few years would have any discernible effect on the conduct of the pro-
jects.
Distribution of the Sample of Projects
Each of the projects studied was identified with its country, industry,
and sampling category (successful, unsuccessful, and on-going) and confiden-
tially with a firm and respondent(s). The distribution of these sample
descriptors are shown in Tables I and II.
Germany, with 47 cases (28.7%), the United Kingdom with 46 cases (28.0%),
and France with 35 cases (21.3%) make up the bulk of our total sample of
164 projects followed by Japan with 21 cases (12.8%) and the Netherlands,
with 15 cases (9.1%). We would like to have had larger representation from
Japan and the Netherlands, because each country is unique in its industrial
structure and industry, government relationships. To our knowledge this is
the first time that any number of extensive project case histories have been
included in a comparative study from either country.
Several industries were included in the study, because the influence
There were two purposes for this. First, it was desirable to have all
projects in roughly the same time period. Second, if they were-fairly recent,
people would be better able to remember events and circumstances. In fact,
not all of the projects were this recent. In a few cases, it was necessary
to go further back in time to find an unsuccessful (or a successful) project.
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and effectiveness of government actions and policies should be expected to
differ on an industry to industry basis. The sample is about evenly divided
among five industries: computers, with 30 cases (18.3%), consumer electronics,
with 32 cases (19.5%), textiles, with 30 cases (18.3%), industrial chemicals,
with 44 cases (26.8%), and automotive, with 28 cases (17.1%) of the total.
The proportion of projects from each industry is similar for West-Germany
and the United Kingdom as shown in Table I. France has a slightly greater
number of textile projects and fewer from the computer and auto industries.
No projects were included from the textile industry in Japan or from the com-
puter or auto industries in the Netherlands.
By design the sample should be evenly divided among industries and
countries across categories of the remaining dimension. In fact this is
roughly true. There are 66 successful cases (40.2%), 51 unsuccessful cases
(31.1%), and 47 which are on-going (28.7%), and these are divided in the same
proportion among industries as shown in Table II and among countries.
Project interviews were conducted in 59 companies, at 64 separate field
sites. The study included projects from both the industrial-chemical divisions
and the textile divisions of two chemical firms and from the comsumer elec-
tronics and computer divisions of two electronics firms. One computer firm
contributed projects from divisions in two countries.
Nearly all the sites were quite large, with only seven reporting sales
of less than 100 million dollars. Nearly all of the sites, with the exception
of three in the computer and three in the textile industry, were divisions
of multi-divisional firms. Only nine of the sites were foreign subsidiaries,
while the rest were national firms. Most of the firms were private cor-
porations with widely held stock, but two were owned by governments, six by families,
and four were closely held. All but 13 of the firms had production facilities lo-
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TABLE I
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF THE SAMPLE OF PROJECTS
IN FIVE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED BY EACH INDUSTRY
Nether- United
Industry Germany Japan France lands Kingdom Total
Computer 9 7 4 0 10 30
Consumer
Electronics 8 6 7 3 8 32
Textiles 6 0 11 7 6 30
Industrial
Chemicals 12 6 9 5 12 44
Automotive 12 2 4 0 10 28
n= 47 21 35 15 46 164
Percent of
total sample 28.7 12.8 21.3 9.1 28.0 100.0
cated in several countries. Most served multiple markets, with 14 of the remainder
serving solely the consumer market and five solely industrial markets. Most of the
firms had several research and development laboratories with only 12 of the sites
reporting having only a central laboratory. Thus, this was not a study of small
technical enterprises, but rather of large firms with multiple owners, divisions,
production facilities and laboratories.
Data Collection and Interviews
The Critical Incident Approach For any number of reasons, respondents might
consciously or unconsciously bias their results, when asked for their opinions
concerning the efficacy of government programs. To avoid this possibility,
the research program was described (quite truthfully) as being concerned with
the environmental factors surrounding successful industrial innovation. The
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non-governmental aspects of our analyses are reported in Utterback, et.al.
(1976). Nothing was said about government policies or actions, per se;
they were merely included among a range of environmental parameters, about
which respondents were queried.
To further avoid bias, respondents were not asked for their opinions,
but rather were asked to recount what had happened in a specific incident.
There were told that our interests lay, not in the typical case that they
faced, but in a specific instance, no matter how atypical that might have
been.
Interviews were conducted with project managers and key personnel from
each project. It was again stressed that the interviewer's interest lay,
not in their usual methods of conducting business but in that specific
project alone. It is important to stress this point, since it is the heart
of the critical incident approach as used here. We didn't want to hear
the people's opinions concerning what was usual or unusual.
TABLE II
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS WHICH WERE SUCCESSFUL,
UNSUCCESSFUL OR ON-GOING IN EACH INDUSTRY
Project Sampling Consumer Industrial Auto-
Category Computer Electronics Textiles Chemicals motive Total
Successful 13 13 12 16 12 66
n = Percent 43.3 40.6 40.0 36.4 42.9 40.2
Unsuccessful 9 10 10 14 8 51
n = Percent 30.0 31.3 33.3 31.8 28.6 31.1
On-Going 8 9 8 14 8 47
n = Percent 26.7 28.1 26.7 31.8 28.6 28.7
Total 30 32 30 44 28 164
n = Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 o00.O 100.0 100.0
-I - - I-1 -1 - - - - - - 

- -- --- --
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Rather, we would make an independent determination from the distributions
revealed in tha data.
Aim of the Interviews There are three broad classes of input to any R&D
project (Figure 1). Each of these can be influenced by government action
or policy. Project performance can potentially be affected by controlling
FINANCIAL
RESOURCES
TECHNICAL
INFORMATION
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MARKET
INFORMATION
&CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
R&D
PROJECT
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Figure 1. Inputs to a R & D Project that can be Potentially
Influenced by Government
any one or more of the three. Interviews then aimed at determining:
a) How the project was financed (both directly and indirectly)
b) How the necessary manpower and technology were obtained.
c) How the market was assessed, and the nature of any external
influences on the market.
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An interview format was developed addressing each of these areas, which
further sought to determine the specific forms or mechanisms through which
governments exerted influence in these three areas.
Mechanisms Through Which Government Influence May be Exerted
Governments are able to control the inputs to R & D projects and
thereby to influence the rate and direction of technological change through
their ability to alter the industrial environment -- market forces, industrial
organization, the structure of rewards, and the regulatory constraints within
which industry operates. Governments can also alter the resources available
to firms -- information, financial and human resources ---and the allocation
of these resources. In affecting either the environment of or resources
available to industrial firms, governments may help to initiate technological
change, to sustain change, or to regulate change in such a way as to ameliorate
its effects. Since the number of possible modes of action available to
government to influence technological innovations is large, it is necessary
to use some sort of simplifying concept to facilitate further analysis. This
should not be so gross as to obscure important differences nor so fine that
the number of categories approaches the number of actions classified.
Direct actions will be categorized into twelve "mechanisms" or "manners
of action". These are listed below based on the way in which they affect
some area important to the innovation process. The categories are not mutually
exclusive, because a given action may have several different effects. For
example, government procurement practices may be both a way of creating
market demand to stimulate innovation and a way of encouraging the formation
of new firms or the entry of existing firms into a new market. The categories
are intended to be collectively exhaustive to allow for reasonable classi-
fication of all the diverse actions and programs found in our study of five
countries. The twelve categories to be used in subsequent analyses are:
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MECHANISMS AFFECTING "THE INNOVATION PROCESS" ITSELF (INITIATING)
These are direct attempts to stimulate innovation where it might otherwise
be non-existent.
1. Stimulating innovation by working through market forces.
2. Reducing the cost to firms of undertaking innovative activities.
3. Reducing the probability of technical or commercial failure.
4. Increasing the rewards to the firm for successful innovation.
5. Encouraging innovation via market invasion
a. by new firms;
b. by old firms invading new markets.
6. Re-structuring an industrial sector.
7. Influencing the organization and management of individual firms.
MECHANISMS AFFECTING RESOURCES (SUSTAINING)
These are attempts to enhance the quality or performance of R&D activity.
8. Influencing the availability, utilization and mobility of managerial
and technical manpower.
9. Assisting institutions (universities, research institutes, private
consulting firms, industries and governments) with regard to the genera-
tion and utilization of technical knowledge.
10. Increasing and transmission and transfer of technical knowledge be-
tween institutions.
MECHANISMS AMELIORATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (RESTRUCTURING)
Projects are sometimes initiated to enable a product or process to meet govern-
ment regulatory standards.
11. Ameliorating the adverse consequences of technology with respect to
the environment and natural resources.
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12. Influencing labor's receptivity to technological change and internalizing
the human costs associated with innovation activity.
For purposes of this study, then, a mechanism is a behavioral concept
and is characterized by a collection of specific programs, institutions, laws,
and regulations which influence technological change. Thus, reducing the
cost of firms of undertaking innovative activity is viewed as one mechanism.
This mechanism, or manner of action, is made operational through several
specific government programs, policies, and regulations, which directly or
indirectly affect technological change. For example, any of a number of means
might be used to reduce the cost to firms of undertaking innovation activities,
including low cost or interest-free loans, loan guarantees, direct subsidies,
tax deductions for R&D, tax holidays, investment tax credits, loans or grants
for regional development, direct contracts, direct provision of equipment or
services, accelerated depreciation (on pilot plant), rules-regarding capital-
ization of R&D, and so forth.
RESULTS
Government influence was felt in one way or another on about 43 percent
of the 164 projects in the sample (Table III). There was, as one would
expect, a wide variety in the ways in which this influence was felt. In about
nine percent of the cases more than one government program operated. In one
case, there were actuallyfour programs affecting a single project.
Operation of Specific Mechanisms
Government mechanisms are classified according to the scheme described
in tle previous section. Following this general format, the highest proportion
of mechanisms encountered were of the initiating class (Table IV). Most of
10.
TABLE III
PROPORTION OF PROJECTS ON WHICH GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS WERE FOUND TO HAVE OPERATED
Number of Government Programs Proportion of Projects
Operating on Project (Percent) (N = 164)
0 57.3%
1 34.1
2 7.3
3 0.6
4 0.6
these were policies which directly paid a portion of the R&D costs, of a project.
Such programs as the Aid to Development in France or the New Technologies
Program in Germany are representative of this class. The next category in
importance was Environmental or Safety Controls (a restructuring mechanism).
This included such instruments as environmental and auto safety standards
as well as pollution control regulation. The third most frequently encountered
mechanism is Technology Transfer (a sustaining mechanism). This included
instruments designed to improve the transfer of information from the university
or government sectors to industry as well as those aimed at importing tech-
nology, through document transfer, people transfer, patent licensing, and so on.
Fourth in frequency was the manipulation of Market Forces (an initiating
mechanism) to stimulate innovative activity. The remaining mechanisms were
encountered at a relatively low frequency, with little difference among them.
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TABLE IV
OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS ON THE PROJECTS
Proportion of All Projects with
Mechanism Government Involvement, in Which
Specific Mechanism Operated (Percent)
(N = 70)*
Initiating Mechanisms 57.2%
Reduce Costs (2) 38.6%
Market Forces (1) 11.4
Market Invasion (5) 4,3
Re-structuring Sector (6) 2.9
Sustaining Mechanisms 37.2
Technology Transfer (10) 22.9
Manpower/Mobility (8) 4.3
Generate Knowledge (9) 2.9
Reduce Risk (3) 5.7
Organization &Management 0
Increase Rewards (4) 1.4
Restructuring Mechanisms 27.2
Lessen Labor'Resistance (12) 2.9
Environment/Safety (11) 4.3
* The figures in the above table are not additive for two reasons:
1. There may be several government programs associated with a given
project as indicated in Table IV.
2. In several cases, a single means of government action was reported
to have operated through more than one mechanism.
Trends Over Time
One might expect from the increased concern with international competition
and the need for innovation, coupled with legislation in the areas of environ-
mental pollution and worker and equipment safety standards, that government in-
volvement in R&D projects would be on the increase. Since the'sample consists
of both completed and ongoing projects, there is an opportunity to make at
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least a rough test of this possibility. Completed projects were with few ex-
ceptions started after 1968 and completed by the time of the study. These
make up about 70 percent of the total. Ongoing projects were begun after 1971
and hadnot yet been completed at the time of the interviews.
There is no evidence in the data that governmental involvement is increas-
ing (Table V). In fact, the proportion of projects in which government was
felt actually decreases among the ongoing projects. Of course these projects
were as yet incomplete, so there was still time for the government influence
to be felt in one way or another. Thus it would not be wise to make too much
of the decrease. Nevertheless, the failure to find an increase with time may
be important.
TABLE V
OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME PERIOD
FOR ALL PROJECTS IN THE SAMPLE
Proportion of Projects on Which
Classification of Project Government Mechanism was Found
Completed (post '68; N = 117) 44.4%
Ongoing (post '71; N = 47) 38.3
2X = 0.03, N.S.
Influence on the Firms's Commitment to the Project
In many cases, the government's influence, while felt by the firm, had
no significant effect either way on the firm's commitment to the project.
Interviewers were asked to indicate whether there was any evidence from the
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interview, that the firm's commitment to support the project had been affected
in any way by government policy or activity. In half of the cases, there was
an indication that the firm's commitment had been so influenced. The interesting
point lies in the fact that this influence is more pervasive among the ongoing
projects (Table VI). One might surmise that governments are either becoming.
more adept at influencing the conduct of industrial ID projects, or are shifting
their influence attempts to different areas in which an effect on the firm's
commitment is more likely to be felt.
To further examine the latter possibility, a comparison of different
forms of influence over time, is made in Table VII. The data show that al-
though there has been some change with time, the shift is not a significant
one. Although a slight shift from initiating to sustaining or restructuring
mechanisms is evident, a statistical test fails to show that this can be at-
tributed to more than random variation in the data.
TABLE VI
GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON FIRM'S COMMITMENT TO THE PROJECT
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME PERIOD
FOR 70 PROJECTS WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Time period Proportion affected by
Government Influence
Completed Projects (post '68; N = 52) 46.3%
Ongoing Projects (post '71; N = 18) 72.2
N = number of projects with government instrument
X2 = 3.66, p = 0.06
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mechanisms is evident, a statistical test fails to show that this can be
attributed to more than random variation in the data.
Since there is no evidence that government strategy has changed sig-
nificantly with time, one is left with the conclusion that either governments
have in fact become more adept at administering strategy or that firms later
perceive that completed projects were less influenced than ongoing projects.
More important, however, is the question of whether the innovative process
has been either aided or hindered by government policy.
Perceived Influence on Project Success
Interviewers were asked to determine whether the government's influence
had functioned in a positive, negative or indifferent manner, with respect
to the success of the project. This measure is somewhat independent of the
final outcome measure, since many projects were failures despite positive
government influence, and even more were successful, in spite of negative
government influence.
TABLE VII
CLASSIFICATION OF MECHANISM EMPLOYED AS
A FUNCTION OF TIME PERIOD
Classification of Mechanism
Time Period initiating sustaining restructuring
Completed Projects,
(post '68; N=64) 46.8% 25.0% 28.1%
Ongoing Projects
(post '71; N=31) 35.5 35.5 29-'.0
N = number of mechanisms (not projects)
x2 - 1.44, N.S.
-. --- - --
-~ .. . .- .
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Overall, governments' influence was more often perceived as negative
than positive (Table VIII).. Furthermore, while the amount of negative influence
may appear to be diminishing, the results are far from significant, statistically.
TABLE VIII
PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON PROJECT
SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME PERIOD
FOR 70 PROJECTS WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Proportion in Which Government
Time Period Influence was Perceived to be:
Negative Positive
Completed Projects
(post '68; N = 52) 19.2% 9.6%
Ongoing Projects
(post '71; N = 18) 11.1 11.1
Overall (N = 70) 17.1 10.0
Government Mechanisms and Performance
When successful and unsuccessful projects are compared in terms of the
mechanisms encountered (TableIX), it can be readily seen that government involve-
ment as perceived by the firm does not guarantee project success. Only in the
case of Environmental/Safety Control is there anything even remotely approaching
a significant difference between successful and unsuccessful projects. Further-
more, given the number of comparisons being made, this could result from random
variation. In general, we have not been able to demonstrate from the firm data
that projects which are affected by government programs are more likely to be
successful than those which are not.
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TABLE IX
OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS RELATED TO PROJECT
SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Proportion of Projects in Which*
Mechanism was Observed (Percent)
Successful Unsuccessful Level of
Mechanism Projects Projects Significance
(N = 66) (N = 51) of Difference
Initiating Mechanisms
Reduce Costs (2) 22.7% 15.7% N.S.**
Market Forces (1) 6.1 5.9 N.S.
Market Invasion (5) 1.5 3.9 N.S.
Re-structure Sector (6) 3.0 3.9 N.S.
Sustaining Mechanisms
Technology Transfer (10) 4.5 11.8 N.S.
Manpower (8) 3.0 3.9 N.S.
Generate Knowledge (9) 1.5 2.0 N.S.
Reduce Risk (3) 4.5 2.0 N.S.
Organization & Management 0.0 2.0 N.S.
Increase Rewards (4) 1.5 0.0 N.S.
Restructuing Mechanisms
Lessen Labor Resistance (12) 3.0 3.9 9 N.S.
Environment/Safety
Controls (11) 10.6 3.9 0.11
One or more government
vehicles associated
with the project 48.5% 39.2% N.S.
*The figures in the above table are not necessarily additive for two reasons:
1) There may be several government programs associated with a given
project as shown in Table III.
2) In several cases, a single program was reported to have operated
through more than one mechanism.
**N.S. = Not statistically significant
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Other Forms of Government Involvment
Interviews were coded to determine whether a project was: (1) a direct
response to a government action, (2) an indirect response, or (3) conducted
any differently because of regulatory constraints (Table XI). Here we find that
it makes no difference whether a project is initiated in either direct or in-
direct response to government action. But government regulatory constraints
are more likely to be found in association with successful projects.
This may come as a bit of a surprise. None of the policies directly
aimed at stimulating innovative performance show any relation to performance,
while regulatory constraints not directly aimed at stimulating innovation
(mostly environmental and safety; Cf. Table X), are related to performance.
One way of viewing environmental/safety regulatory constraints is that they
add critical performance dimensions to the problem space faced by the engineer.
An engineer faced with a technical problem attempts to fit a solution into an
envelope defined along a number of critical dimensions, e.g., cost, weight,
energy consumption, resolution, channel isolation, etc. (Frischmuth & Allen,
1969). The introduction of regulatory constraints increases the number of
critical dimensions, making the problem space that much more complex.
Problem dimensions can vary in the extent to which improvements along them
will yield to technical effort. Cost, for example, might be very difficult to
reduce, while power output could be relatively easy to increase. To some
extent this might be a function of the total amount of effort expended in at-
tempting to force improvements along a given dimension. As technology advances,
its potential along particular dimensions may in some cases be fully utilized.
In others it may be underutilized. In the case where available technology has
been underutilized in its application to a specific dimension, improvements along
that dimension should be relatively easy to accomplish.
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In addition, government regulation gave a very high priority to the project.
It was not the usual case in which the outcome of the project would have an
influence of a few percentage points on sales, important as that might be.
Government requirements for entering or remaining in a market affect a very large
proportion sometimes even 100 percent of sales. In the extreme, either the
regulations are met, or there will be no sales. This obviously accords the
project high priority. The "crash" project phenomenon can then occur. Formal
organizational channels are bypassed, new informal links are established, and
the potential for creative solution is enhanced. In addition, older established
technologies are often re-examined in a new light with a concomitant opportunity
for significant improvement. Units dealing with these technologies are accorded
a new status in the organization, and the resulting esprit can also increase
the probability of significant advancement.
TABLE X
OTHER FORMS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT RELATED
TO PROJECT SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Proportion of Projects in Which
Factor was Present (Percent)
Successful Unsuccessful Level of
Projects Projects Significance
(N = 66) (N = 51) of Difference
Project authorized in direct
response to government action 9.1% 2.0% N.S.*
Project authorized as indirect
result of government action 16.7 9.8 N.S.
Government regulatory constraints
were perceived to be highly
significant in the conduct of
the project 15.2 2.0 0.01
*N.S. = Not statistically significant
. ~ ~ ~ ~ -_
__ __

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This is what has happened in the case of many of the new government
regulatory constraints. Government regulation demands innovation. The
technology for accomplishing innovation in product safety, pollution reduction,
etc., is often readily avialable. The only reason these improvements had not
been introduced is because the dimension of safety or reduced pollution was not
seen by the engineer as a critical dimension in his problem space, or was
given a lower rating relative to other dimensions. Government regulatory
action re-orders priorities among dimensions. Once long-neglected dimensions
are given some importance, a reservoir of technology can be tapped, which will
allow relatively rapid improvement.
Furthermore, since government regulations are often stated in terms of
fairly precise specifications, the problem solver is allowed, indeed tempted,
to place these fixed requirements on the critical dimensions. There is no pay-
off for optimizing along the dimensions, one need only meet the specification.
When this is the case, Frischmuth & Allen (1966) argue that such dimensions
operate as a filter, through which each potential solution is passed with a go/
no-go decision on each dimension. Such dimensions are viewed as more important
than those along which there is some freedom of movement. Consequently, greater
resources are applied to meeting the fixed requirements, and this coupled with
the availability of untapped technology increases the likelihood of successful
accomplishments.
Related to this, at least in the case of the auto industry, is the fact
that most of the regulations had been developed by the United States government.
U.S. standards for emission control and auto safety tended, at the time of the
study, to be the most restrictive. European and Japanese manufacturers hoping
to export their products to the U.S. were therefore forced to set their design
goals to the most severe case, viz. U.S. standards. These standards did not
present the firms with unattainable design goals, or goals that were unlikely
20.
to be successfully achieved. The reason for this is very simple. They were
not set in a vacuum. There was a considerable degree of industry involvement
in the establishment of the standards. Industry may not have desired the
standards, and probably would have never imposed them on themselves. However,
once it became apparent that standards would be set, the U.S. auto industry
set about to influence the government regulatory bodies in order to set goals
that could be realistically attained.3 In other words, they recognized the
fact that there was an available reservoir of technology that could be applied
to increase product performance along the critical dimensions of emission
control and safety. They evidently worked to assure that standards were es-
tablished which were within reach of this available technology.
Industry Variations
Governmental influence is felt in all five industries (Table XI). albeit
to varying degrees. Industrial chemicals is the most heavily affected industry,
followed closely by computers and autos. Consumer electronics and textiles,
not surprisingly, are the least affected.
The type of mechanism also varied considerably by industry (Table XII).
Initiating mechanisms were most frequently employed in the computer industry.
This industry has come to be recognized as important in assessing national pres-
tige. Consequently, several countries have launched programs to build, or en-
hance their computer industry. The principal technique, employed in doing this,
has been the initiating mechanism, wherein the government directly subsidizes
research and development, or guarantees a market for domestic computer developments.
3In particular, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
charged with proposing safety standards for automobiles may only propose such
regulations as are known to be "technically feasible".
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TABLE XI
GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE BY INDUSTRY
FOR ALL PROJECTS IN THE SAMPLE
Proportion of All Projects
on Which at Least one
Program was Found
Industry (Percent)
Computers (N = 30) 50.0%
Consumer electronics (N = 32) 28.1
Textiles (N = 30) 26.7
Industrial chemicals (N = 44) 54.5
Automobiles (N = 28) 50.0
X2 = 9.72, p = 0.05
Sustaining mechanisms are found most often in chemicals and textiles and
seldom in consumer electronics. The most frequently encountered form of sustain-
ing mechanism is that which attempts to stimulate technology transfer
out of the university/government sector and into industry. In textiles, technology
transfer is attempted, principally through the use of intermediary institutions,
e.g. research associations and research institutes under joint industry/government
auspices. In chemicals, attempts have been made in several of the countries
to promote university - industry interaction in the chemical industry.
Restructuring mechanisms are found principally in the automobile industry.
These have to do mainly with pollution control and safety standards introduced,
to the industry, in recent years.
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Influence on the Commitment of the Firms
Governmental influence on the commitment of firms to specific projects
did not vary significantly across industries (Table XIII). The range of values
extends from 57 percent of projects, on which project commitment was influenced
in the auto industry, to 33 percent in computers. A statistical text, however,
indicates that this could be merely random variation. The net conclusion must
be that the present evidence is insufficient to support any possibility of inter-
industry variation in government-induced commitment.
Effect on Perceived Project Success
Government influence has been more of a negative than positive factor in
project success, as perceived by the firms (Table X). Despite this, in nearly
half (42 percent) of the cases in which government influence was perceived as
negative, the project, itself, was successful.
TABLE XIII
INFLUENCE ON FIRM'S COMMITTMENT BY INDUSTRY FOR 70 PROJECTS
WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Proportion of Projects in
Which Government Significantly
Industry Influenced Firm's Commitment
Computers (N = 15) 33.3%
Consumer electronics (N = 9) 55.5
Textiles (N = 8) 62.5
Industrial chemicals (N = 24) 50.0
Automobiles (N = 14) 57.1
X2 -2.71, p = N.S.
"1111--^-------------·_I_·______._
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Government influence was perceived to be detrimental in the computer,
chemical and auto industries. It was perceived as beneficial in the elec-
tronics and textile industries. The reasons behind the negative view of
government influence in chemicals and autos is fairly obvious. In these
industries, government influence most frequently took the form of restructuring
mechanisms designed to control pollution or improve product safety. The
purpose of such government action is not to make the process of innovation
any easier. While it very often stimulates innovative activity, it is viewed
by industry as increasing problem difficulty, rather than aiding problem solu-
tion.
In textiles and electronics, government influence usually took the form
of initiating or sustaining mechanisms. These were naturally viewed as a
positive contribution to project success.
TABLE XW·
PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON
PROJECT SUCCESS BY INDUSTRY
FOR 70 PROJECTS WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Proportion in Which Government
Influence was Perceived to be:
Industry Negative Positive
Computer (N = 15) 20.0% 6.7%
Consumer electronics (N = 9) 11.1 22.2
Textiles (N = 8) 0.0 25.0
Industrial chemicals (N = 24) 12.5 4.2
Automobiles (N = 14) 28.6 0.0
Overall (N - 70) 14.3 8.6
X2 = 7.31, p = 0.13
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The computer industry is more puzzling. In the four countries in which
this industry was studied, the government had attempted very strongly to stimulate
its development. One would expect government's contribution, in this industry,
to be perceived as at least somewhat positive. In fact, government had little
perceived impact in three of the four countries. In the fourth (the U.K.) the
impact was viewed as negative on several projects, because in the government's
attempt to rationalize the industry, through the strengthening of one firm, other
firms felt that they had suffered. This effect was seen on specific projects,
in the pronounced shortage of certain forms of competence, which had been trans-
ferred out of the firm. In restructuring the industry, government had brought
about the transfer of certain critical talents out of these firms. These indi-
viduals were then no longer available for either direct staffing or consulting
support to the projects. Hopefully, they were making a contribution in their
new organization, but this was not without a serious cost to their former or-
ganizations.
In consumer electronics and particularly in textiles, government influence
is, on balance, perceived as positive. The emphasis in these two industries
is on initiating and sustaining mechanisms, with particular weight given to
technology transfer in the textile industry (Table XII).
National Variations
The five countries varied to some degree in the extent to which mechanisms
were found in the sample (Table XV). The greatest government involvement
(19 out of 35 projects) was found in France, and in Holland the least (4 out of
15 projects). This variation is, however, not sufficient to be considered
significant, statistically.
26.
TABLE XV
OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS BY
COUNTRY FOR ALL PROJECTS IN THE SAMPLE
Country Proportion of Projects On Which
at Least One Mechanism was Found
(Percent)
France (N = 35) 54.3%
West Germany (N = 47) 36.2
Japan (N = 21) 47.6
Netherlands (N-= 15) 26.7
United Kingdom (N = 46) 43.5
X2 = 4.69, p = N.S.
f .
Country Strategies Countries differ considerably in the strategies undertaken
to influence innovation. France, for example, has had a very heavy emphasis
on initiating mechanisms while Britain has used this approach hardly at all
(Table XVII). West Germany shows little evidence of the use of sustaining
mechanisms on the projects in the sample: France and the Netherlands did not
rely very heavily on restructuring mechanisms. [Note, however, that the Nether-
lands sample is rather small. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe
from other sources that both labor and environmental policies do influence
Dutch firms. (cf. Center for Policy Alternatives, 1976 .
In comparing successful and unsuccessful projects in rte five countries
with the forms of mechanism used, one finds essentially no difference in any
27.
of the countries studied. The comparative differences do not have statistical
significance. This is in agreement with earlier findings that, with the ex-
ception of environmental/ safety regulations, there was little or no relation
between the presence of a government mechanism and project success. The same
results occur at the individual country level. In summary, it made little
difference in the aggregate as to what strategy a country pursued, insofar as
theultimate criterion of project outcome, i.e. success or failure, was concerned.
Again this may merely be a reflection of the observation that government involve-
ment may be a necessary condition but is not a sufficient condition for project
success. Some government programs (e.g., French aid to Development) are reserved
for projects which are considered significantly more risky than the average
(though presumably with greater payoff if successful). Thus one should not
expect to find use of this type of mechanism strongly correlated with project
success.
Influence on the Commitment of the Firm
The degree to which a firm's commitment to a project was influenced by
the government varied significantly across countries (Table XVII). France
and West Germany were the most successful in this respect, while Britain was
least successful. In Table XVI may be found a possible explanation. Both
France and Germany rely primarily on initiating mechanisms. The United Kingdom
made very little use of this class of mechanism. An initiating mechanism is
almost certain to influence firm commitment. If the concept of an initiating
mechanism is working properly, projects will be undertaken which otherwise
wouldn*t have been considered. The data in Tables XVI and XVII provide some
support for the proposition that this is, in fact, happening.
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TABLE XVII
INFLUENCE OF FIRM'S COMMITMENT BY COUNTRY FOR
70 PROJECTS WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Proportion of Projects in Which
Country Government Significantly Influenced
Firm's Commitment (Percent)
France (N = 19) 68.4%
West Germany (N = 17 64.7
Japan (N = 10) 40.0
Netherlands (N = 4) 50.0
United Kingdom (N = 20) 25.0
2
X2 = 11.66, p = 0.02
Arguments have been raised that initiating mechanisms do not achieve their
purpose, since firms use them to support projects to which they are already
committed (Sirbu, in press). That is, they see a greater possibility of getting
government support for "safe" projects; they then use the money thus freed in
the budget to support more marginal projects, which themselves would not have
been able to attract government interest. The interviews revealed a few in-
stances in which things happened just this way. A more complete look at the
data, however, indicates that this may not characterize the entire sample.
The possibility of government support did influence the commitment to a project.
The proportion of successful projects was no different for those projects
receiving government support than for those which did not.
Influence on Project Success
The Netherlands is the only country in which government activity was per-
'-----------
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ceived to have had any positive influence on project success (Table XVIII).
The number of projects in The Netherlands was very small, however, and not much
should be concluded from the firm study alone, other than the fact that noe of
the larger countries was perceived to be as outstanding in its ability to
influence success.
TABLE XVIII
PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON
PROJECT SUCCESS BY COUNTRY
FOR 70 PROJECTS WITH SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT VEHICLES
Country Proportion in Which Government
Influence was Perceived to be:
negative potitive
France (N = 19) 10.5% 15.8%
West Germany (N = 17) 23.5 5.9
Japan (N = 10) 10.0 0.0
Netherlands (N = 4) 0.0 50.0
United Kingdom (N = 20) 25.0 5.0
2
X = 6.82, p = 0.08
_ __ __ _I_ __
_____ _ _ __
_ _ _
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SUMMARY
The major findings of the study can be summarized around six points.
1. Government involvement was found in a fairly high (42.7%) proportion of
the projects studied.
2. Of the twelve possible mechanisms which describe government influence,
three were predominant: reducing costs to the firms (18.3% of all projects),
regulations for environmental quality and product safety (12.2%) and tech-
nology transfer (9.8%).
3. Government involvement did appear to increase a firm's commitment to a
project. Overall, government influence was more often perceived by the
firms as negative rather than positive. However, in general the propor-
tion of successful and unsuccessful projects was about the same whether
or not the government was involved.
4. There is an important exception of this last statement. Regulatory
constraints of various kinds, primarily environmental and product safety
requirements in the industrial chemical and auto industries, were more
often associated with project success.
More importantly, however, with regard to environmental/safety regulations,
is the perception by the managers that the projects were conducted differ-
ently because of these regulations. This occurred far more often for
successful, in contrast to unsuccessful, projects.
5. There were some striking differences among industries in the types of
government actions encountered. The mechanisms found were primarily:
. Funding (reducing the cost to firms) in the computer and electronics
industries
. Technical assistance (technology transfer) in textiles
· Environmental/safety regulation in industrial chemicals and autos.
However, the number of projects affected in each industry is too small
to discern anything about the effects on success or failure by industry.
6. There were also striking country differences.
The contrast between Germany and the United Kingdom is particularly
notable, and about the same industry proportions are represented
in these subsamples.
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For the most part German firms reported primarily government actions which
we would expect to influence product development in its early
stages. British firms, on the other hand, reported government
actions which we expect to be important at late stages of a product's
evolution.
. Japan also stands out as a notable case emphasizing mainly funding,
technology transfer and regulation. However, here the sample is
biased and relatively small.
Again the number of projects affected in each country is too small to
discern much about the effects on success or failure by country. However,
there are significant differences in the governments' influence on the firm's
commitment in the different countries.
Of course, the most significant aspect of the study lies in its failure to
detect any effect, on project performance, of government attempts to stimulate
innovation. Governments have tried in a variety of ways, as can be seen through
the study, to do just this. If project success or failure can be taken as any
measure of effectiveness of these actions, then little can be said to have re-
sulted from all of this expenditure of effort and money.
Finally, there is the somewhat unexpected effect of government regulation.
Government regulations, by establishing new criteria for defining a successful
product or process, force innovation to occur, often in areas that have been
long neglected by market or technological forces.
33.
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